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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STACIE POWELL, 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : Case No. 20110195 
COMMERCE, 
: Agency No. DOPL-OSC-2-2007-51 
Respondent. : 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Department of Commerce 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In this licensing action, petitioner seeks review of the February 2, 2011 Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Review issued by the executive director of the 
Utah Department of Commerce. R. 1-13. The executive director concluded that, by 
failing to comply with the terms of a December 1, 2008 stipulation staying revocation of 
her license to practice as a registered nurse, petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct 
for which revocation was an appropriate sanction. Petitioner filed her timely petition for 
review on March 4,2011. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009) gives this 
Court jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies[.]ft 
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ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Did substantial evidence from the record as a whole support the findings of fact 
underlying the revocation of petitioner's license, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009)? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether an agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, the reviewing court "must simply determine, in light of the evidence 
before the [agency], whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the 
[agency]. It is not our prerogative to weigh the evidence anew." Patterson v. Utah Cnty. 
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1995); see also Save Our Canyons v. 
Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake Cnty., 2005 UT App'285,112,116 P.3d 978 (quoting 
Patterson). 
2. Was the revocation of petitioner's license "otherwise arbitrary and capricious" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv) (West 2009)? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court "freview[s] claims that an agency action 
was arbitrary and capricious for reasonableness.1" Bourgeous v. State Dep't of Commerce, 
2002 UT App .5,1.7, 41 P.3d 461 (quoting Anderson v. Pub. Serv, Common, 839 P.2d 822, 
824 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
In October, 2009, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(DOPL) initiated this action with a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause 
Hearing, based on a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause. R. 200-220.l The case 
was heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on January 14, 2010. R. 161 
(hearing transcript). On May 18, 2010, the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact[,J 
Conclusions of Law[,] and Recommended Order, R. 144-59, concluding that protection of 
the public health, safety, and welfare warranted revocation of petitioner's license to 
practice as a registered nurse based on her willful and repeated violations of the 
December 1,2008 stipulation. The DOPL director adopted the ALJ's findings, 
conclusions, and recommended order the same day. R. 143. Petitioner filed a request for 
agency review on June 17, 2010, R. 114-116, and a renewed request on October 29, 2010, 
R. 52-54. On February 2, 2011, the executive director of the Utah Department of 
Commerce (Department) affirmed DOPL's order and sustained the revocation. R. 1-13. 
The present petition for review ensued. 
*The agency's record has been numbered in reverse chronological order; therefore, 
the oldest documents have the highest numbers, and the most recent documents have the 
lowest. 
3 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts2 
Petitioner has been licensed to practice as a registered nurse in Utah since October 
2, 1996. She was concurrently licensed in Arizona. On April 5, 2004, petitioner self-
reported inappropriate use of controlled substances to the Arizona Board of Licensing. 
After she agreed to participate in a three-year recovery program, petitioner tested positive 
for oxycodone four times and for alcohol on one occasion. She also failed to undergo a 
required chemical dependency evaluation and violated several other of the agreement's 
requirements. Arizona revoked petitioner's license on November 3, 2006. 
Despite that revocation, when petitioner applied to renew her Utah license on 
January 5, 2007, she denied surrendering or having had disciplinary action taken against a 
license to practice in a regulated profession since the last renewal. She entered into a 
stipulation on March 7, 2007, revoking her Utah license but staying the revocation 
pending completion of a five-year probation on specified terms and conditions. Petitioner 
2The Department of Commerce objects to petitioner's Statement of Material Facts 
as incomplete, misleetding, and, in part, irrelevant. Rather than draw from the facts as 
found by the ALJ and the executive director in their respective decisions, petitioner states 
the facts favorable to her position, and often omits relevant context from transcript 
quotations. Moreover, petitioner erroneously implies that DOPL failed to establish a 
substance abuse problem. See Pet'r Brief at 5-7. The Verified Motion for Order to Show 
Cause was based not on allegations of drug abuse, but on petitioner's multiple violations 
of the December 1, 2008 Stipulation and Order. See R. 203-05; see also R. 161 at 
44:12-14 (ALJ's observation that "the Division is not claiming an unauthorized use of 
controlled substances[.]M). 
Unless otherwise specified, the Department's Statement of Relevant Facts is taken 
from the findings contained in the executive director's decision. See R. 2-4. Petitioner's 
brief does not specifically take issue with any of these findings. 
4 
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did not comply and DOPL issued an Amended Notice of Agency Action on September 8, 
2008, alleging violations of the 2007 stipulation, including failure to provide drug testing 
samples on 24 occasions, failure to submit monthly self-assessment reports, and failure to 
document participation in a professional support group and 12-step program. Though she 
claimed concerns about the integrity of samples she had previously provided for drug 
testing, petitioner admitted the alleged conduct, R. 209-11, % 6, and then entered into the 
December 1,2008 stipulation at issue in the present appeal. As a part of that stipulation, 
she admitted that her past actions constituted unprofessional conduct, as defined by 
statute, for which DOPL is justified in discipliningher. R.211, f 7. 
The 2008 stipulation directs that DOPL shall determine the time and place for drug 
testing, that failure to provide a sample for drug testing may be considered a positive 
result and may subject petitioner to additional sanctions, and that petitionershall inform 
DOPL in writing within one week of providing a sample if she believes proper procedure 
was not followed. It further provides for sanctions up to and including revocation should 
petitioner test positive for alcohol, unreported prescription drugs, controlled substances, 
or mood-altering substances, or violate any practice-related law or a term or condition of 
the stipulation. Finally, it recites that petitioner has read and understands each and every 
paragraph of the stipulation. See R. 211 -17. 
The Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause alleged that petitioner violated the 
2008 Stipulation and Order when she (1) failed to meet with the Division as specified; (2) 
failed to provide a copy of a prescription for hydrocodone, a controlled substance; (3) 
5 
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failed to submit to drug testing as ordered; (4) failed to provide certain monthly reports 
and documentation; and (5) failed to notify the Board of Nursing within one week of a 
change in job status. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the evidence supported each 
of the charged violations except for the failure to provide monthly reports and 
documentation, and recommended that DOPL revoke petitioner's license. R. 144-159. 
DOPL Director Mark B. Steinagel adopted the recommendation in a May 18, 2010 Order 
that Francine A. Giani, Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, affirmed on 
February 2, 2011. R. 143,1-13. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner argues that her license revocation is not supported by substantial 
evidence because it was based on DOPL's assumption that she has a drug abuse problem. 
Pet'r Brief at 11. But petitioner's premise is erroneous; The revocation was based not on 
any assumption about petitioner's drug abuse, but on her violation of four explicit 
provisions of the 2008 Stipulation and Order to which she signed her assent. R. 218. In 
that stipulation, she further agreed that she had read and understood each of the 
stipulation's paragraphs, and had no questions about any of its provisions. The stipulation 
warned that any violation of its terms and conditions could subject petitioner to sanctions 
up to and including revocation. In light of these provisions, the evidence of her 
violations-which she has failed to marshal-is more than sufficient to meet the substantial 
evidence standard. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petitioner's argument that the revocation is arbitrary and capricious fares no better. 
In support, petitioner claims that (1) DOPL lacked evidence that she has a drug abuse 
problem, (2) DOPL imposed revocation only because petitioner was insufficiently 
remorseful for her noncompliance, and (3) revocation was inconsistent with sanctions 
DOPL applied in similar cases. The first ground fails because revocation was based on 
evidence that petitioner failed to comply with the 2008 stipulation, not on evidence of 
drug abuse. Next, any expressed disappointment regarding petitioner's apparent failure to 
learn from her past mistakes speaks also to her credibility and the likelihood that a lesser 
sanction would not achieve the compliance that petitioner twice promised-but did not 
deliver-by signing the 2007 and 2008 stipulations. And as reflected in both the DOPL 
and Department orders, petitioner's repeated refusals to comply with the required drug 
testing support the reasonable conclusion that lesser measures would be ineffective to 
produce compliance and inadequate to protect the public from her unprofessional 
conduct. Finally, petitioner fails to specifically identify any similar case applying a lesser 
sanction, and also fails to show where in the record she raised the issue of inconsistent 
discipline; that issue is therefore waived for purposes of review. 
For these reasons, there is no basis to disturb the Department's decision. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEPARTMENT'S 
FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED MULTIPLE CONDITIONS 
OF THE 2008 STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Though she claims the revocation decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence, petitioner does not identify any specific finding of fact that is unsupported. 
Instead, she argues at length that the record contains no evidence establishing that she has 
a substance abuse problem. But petitioner's argument misses the point: DOPL did not 
allege that petitioner engaged in substance abuse. During the hearing, the ALJ responded 
to an inquiry by the DOPL director about drug test results, stating, "Well, then, I think, 
Mr. Steinegal [sic], the proper response to your inquiry would be, since the Division is 
not claiming an unauthorized use of controlled substances, the test that you're referencing 
in your question is of no relevance to the issues in this proceeding." R. 161 at 44:10-16. 
Instead, DOPL charged petitioner with violating five specific provisions of the 2008 
Stipulation and Order to which she had agreed in writing: 
a) failing to meet with the Division on May 28, 2008 in violation of 
Section 7(1 )a of the Order; 
b) failing to provide a copy of a prescription for hydrocodone to the 
Division that she received on April 3, 2009 in violation of Section 7(1 )d of 
the Order; , 
c) failing to sign up with Compass Vision for drug testing in violation 
of Section 7(l)f of the Order; 
d) failing to provide reports and documentation to the Division on the 
first day of the month for the months of May, June and July 2009 in 
violation of [Section] 7(1 )i of the Order; 
e) failing to notify the Board in writing within one week of any change 
in employer, employment or practice status in violation of Section 7(1 )r or 
the Order. 
8 
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R. 204-05. Each allegation addresses conduct, other than substance abuse, that violated 
identified requirements of the stipulation, and DOPL found that substantial evidence 
supported all but the failure to provide timely reports and documentation. R. 153-56. 
The Department accepted those findings as conclusive, and observed that "Petitioner has 
failed to identify any findings that she wishes to challenge or to properly marshal the 
evidence in support of those findings." R. 6. 
On judicial review, petitioner has again failed to identify any of the specific 
findings as unsupported by substantial evidence. In fact, as to the most serious of the 
allegations, failure to sign up for drug testing, petitioner concedes in her brief that she 
"admittedly n^ade a poor decision in not registering for the drag testing program." Pet'r 
Brief at 13. As to the remaining^ violations, petitioner does iiot address them at all. 
A party challenging the findings of a trial forum "must marshal a//relevant 
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly eironepus." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Utah App. 1991). The Court has described the marshaling process as "not unlike 
becoming the devil's advocate," id. at 1315, and mandated that "[cjounsel must extricate 
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position." Id. 
Proper marshaling requires the challenger to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. By completely 
9 
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failing to marshal the evidence underlying any of the findings regarding her 
noncompliance with the stipulation's terms and conditions, petitioner has given the Court 
no basis on which to overturn them. 
Moreover, because she did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in her 
administrative appeal, petitioner has failed to preserve that issue for review by the Court. 
In Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993), Ashcroft 
sought judicial review of an Industrial Commission order denying workers1 compensation 
benefits. The ALJ made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Ashcroft moved for 
administrative review of the ALJHs decision, but failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence or the adequacy of the AL J V findings, asserting a different basis for error. The 
commission rejected the alternative rationale, adopted the ALJTs findings, and affirmed 
the decision. Ashcroft argued to this Court that the findings were inadequate and 
insufficiently supported by the evidence. The Court declined to consider those issues 
because Ashcroft had failed to raise them on administrative review. The Court cited to 
Pease v. Industrial Commission of Utah for the principle that a petitioner, in filing for 
administrative review, ,fha[s] the has the obligation to raise all the issues that could have 
been presented at that time, and those issues not raised were waived." Pease v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
Like the petitioner in Ashcroft, petitioner here obtained administrative review of 
the ALJfs decision, but failed to challenge the ALJ's findings, which the executive 
director adopted. Consequently, even if, in her brief to this Court, petitioner had 
10 
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identified spec Mir findings and marshaled the evidence'supporting them, her challenge to 
the sufficiency of that evidence conies inn l.iilr lm MUM "< inn's consideration. Petitioner 
has therefore waived her claim that substantial evidence does not supporl (lir findings by 
failing to preset ve it in the administrative review of the DOPL decision, and those 
findings wa *•• ; .... epartmenfs ~»rder. 
II THE DP;PARTMHNI S Dlx'lshjr, i i, .-;!•. * • >Kr PETITIONER'S 
\ I JRSIN* i I I CENSE IS NUi ARBITRARY AND ( APRICIOUS 
.°u icr
 (i. ,o ud^ ihc lack of evidence of a subst.uice abuse problem to support 
her claim thai the ivvooilioit i »f' (u i In vnse io practice is arbitrary and capricious.. See 
PetV Brief at 14. Because, as explained JN • ^ - - •• lbuse was not nt 
issue in tins action this argument fails to show the Depaitmenfb decisio 
and capricious1 t VIIIHMICI also argues (1) that the Department inaccurately concluded she 
was insufficiently remorse Jill fm lirt j,iMii\ ,ih<i I 'l ihai (lie I department did not revoke 
the licenses of other nurses with admitted substance abuse problem!* win - engaged in 
"repeal inslanees ol egregious and intentional noncompliance^]11 Pet'r Brief at 16-1 1 n..L 
Neither arpumen l tin ree*K bn ;mse it* dliu demonstrates thai the sanction of revocation is' 
unreasonable in liuht of petitioner's conduct. 
I etitJoncr*:> claim that revocation has not been consistent!*, -mplied to ( " 
with bu » i -nam e hi^ioiics can he icadily dispatcher __e 
argument consists of only a foot . . ., ,.^  .ne asserts that 
"these other nurse<" diil n<4 ha\t then licenses permanent? **•  * > •'•- • i ) s i ; i 
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petitioner does not identify any particular individual by name, case number, or factual 
circumstances.Without this information, the Court lacks a basis for comparison. But 
more importantly, petitioner points to nowhere in the record where she raised this 
argument in the administrative proceedings. Just as she waived her attack on sufficiency 
of the evidence, she has waived the issue of consistency in disciplinary sanctions. 
Petitioner's contention that the Department improperly sanctioned her for failing to 
be sufficiently remorseful is, in its essence, an argument implicating her credibility and 
wilfulness. She claims that because she never intended to be noncompliant, her 
noncompliance should be excused. See Petfr Brief at 15. But petitioner has ignored the 
Department's rationale for concluding that a lesser sanction would be ineffective to 
correct her unprofessional conduct. The executive director explained, "Petitioner 
admitted that she is in violation of several provisions of the 2008 Stipulation and Order, 
the most important of which was failing to register with Compass Vision [for drug 
testing]. The drug screening was the only objective way for the Division to determine 
whether Petitioner was engaging in unauthorized substance abuse." R. 9. The director 
also noted that even though petitioner had previously reported misgivings about the 
reliability of the drug testing, she chose to enter the 2008 stipulation despite those 
concerns. R. 9. Moreover, that stipulation provided petitioner an avenue to report any 
additional concerns about the testing procedures: "If Respondent believes that proper 
procedure was not followed by any person during the collection and transfer of the 
sample, Respondent shall inform the Division in writing within one week of providing the 
12 
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sample." R. 213. Petitioner did not avail herself of fhr. mrflmd In assure accuracy in 
trsttii^, instead', she unilaterally chose not to comply with testinr * ;• 
r^ciiioiierf6 eJ;ii! -^ compliance was unintentional rings hollow; 
\s the executive director obsr-v. d, ((u1 stipulation \ ua ed petitioner » u notin ^oiii 
that failing to provide samples for drug testing could ' ' - -,m\. Imp r^il* 
and that sanctions including revocation, could be imposed loi failure lu c» »r 
of the stipulation"o Lei. . .in i oner agreed that she had read each 
and every paragraph of the Stipulation anu • ' •.. •*: 101*. • .• *A 
Moreover, petitioner was represented by counsel throughout the .*.!).;•*.> • i : imp up 
to the 2008 stipi IIHIMU I f lie executive director < included that "Petitionei fad: ' • 
= stat iish that the sanction of revocation \ x asi 1.111 ea sonable given her prior history and in 
Iiglii oj Uie iact that revocation was an agreed-upon consequent v for failing to comply 
with --1 ••• *. .? nd Order." R 11 Nothing in petitioner's brief conlradicls I he 
executive dircctoi 5 icasoi; '•- i" • •,n--i* .ecisinn 
Petitioner has had multiple opportunities lo * an (din her conduct to professional 
..(jiiduf J",, i)(ih lust revoked petitioner's license in 2007, but stayed thai noli* «n pending 
completion of a live ^ - etitioner failed to comply with the terms 
oi that probation, Nonetheless, DOPL ti;ive petidenu ,t M\ OIHJ opportunity to succeed-
under (he ?l'»08 stipulation, negotiated with the assistance of petition . ,.^.
 ( . > 
which petitioner evpiesNly agreed V"V i/hout notifying DOPL of any new c< >-\c *• 
stipulation required, petilM»ne» nmliiirrnlly decided not to undergo dmg testing, and also 
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violated other stipulated conditions, knowing those violations could subject her to license 
revocation. On these uncontested facts, the Department reasonably concluded that license 
revocation was the only effective means to protect the public from petitioner's persistent 
unprofessional conduct. Because petitioner has not shown that decision to be arbitrary 
and capricious, it is entitled to affirmance by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, the Department respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the Department's decision revoking petitioner's license to practice as a registered 
nurse. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because the controlling legal standards are clear and the facts underlying the 
Department's decision are uncontested, the Department does not believe oral argument is 
necessary in this case. However, it desires to participate if oral argument is ordered by 
the Court. 
DATED t h i s ^ t L - d a y of July, 201L 
/Z. u ^ 
Nancy L Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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i hciwy cenny tiia; on ihis cQu^-. day of July. 2<-'i ; i •, auscd 10 tx K-.^cd, lirst 
class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies oi »he foregoing BRIEF Ob 
RESPONDENT <o fie f » i u — 
rwiIHRINEM I.AK.v/.V 
JENNIFER R. CARR1ZAL 
Strong & Hanni 
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